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and the task is not easy, but it is vital if the democracies are to surmount the perplexities of sustaining morale in a limited war situation.

The most promising clue is contained in another paradox; views of the past and the present must coexist and become synthesized. The crux of the educational principle is that it must be easy to grasp and credible once it is grasped.

I suggest provisionally the following scheme. Limited war must continue to be seen as a war of national survival. But patience must be exercised and immediate goals probably must be modest. The breaking off of a war on apparently unfavorable terms must not be regarded as an irremediable catastrophe; neither must a limited victory be heralded as the harbinger of inevitable triumph. Stability must become a word with heroic connotations. If threats of escalation are launched by the enemy, the public must be trained to recognize that this same violence could be launched

* This judgment is based on the premise that no future limited war directly involving the United States could possibly resemble Korea with its general lack of civilian anxiety. In an age of ICBM's, a crash air alert and maximum strategic readiness would characterize continental defense preparations in a limited war. In such circumstances an enemy would be far better advised to launch a massive strategic strike in time of *détente* and without warning.

at any moment and that the hazard is no greater than in time of peace—less great, in fact.*

Finally, the public must accept the notion that if limited war comes, it is probably only through a series of such conflicts, pursued with vigor and the skill of adaptation, that we have any real hope of holding the adversary at bay long enough for some change in his philosophy to take place without intervening nuclear catastrophe. This latter sequence is unpredictable and it is folly to grasp at straws in the wind, as many eminent Soviet observers do from time to time, but this probably remains our only clear salvation from the world's present predicament.

These injunctions are, perhaps, self-evident to many readers. But have they become a cornerstone of public education in military matters? Can the man in the street repeat them and, in time of war, would he react as if he believed them? It will not be time enough in the stress of battle to make these points and have their logic prevail. The man in the line cannot stop firing to go to school for the causes of the war and the justification of the means by which it is being fought. But there is time—now.

Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need—not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle year in and year out, 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation'—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

President John F. Kennedy



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

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NOT only is intelligence vital in diplomacy, but it is absolutely essential in defense, for you must know the composition of the enemy forces, the weapons they will use, the direction of the attack, and their intentions in order to enable our own defense structure to be properly constructed and properly alerted.

What are we doing to meet the challenges that threaten the very existence of our way of life? This is not an easy question to answer, particularly in public. If we say too much about how much we know, or how we operate, or what we are doing, we are

providing hostile services with essential ingredients of information such as we are seeking from them. On the other hand, it is of great importance that the American public have confidence in the work of their intelligence organization, for this is our first line of defense.

In order to approach an answer to this subject, let me describe the evolution of our intelligence organization since World War II. We went into World War II with various intelligence services operating out of Washington—the Army, the Navy, the State Department, and others—with very little in the way of a central organization. The result was that in many instances not all of the information was ever compiled or assessed or analyzed in one place, nor was one view presented to the President and the policymakers in the government.

President Roosevelt was so seriously concerned about the quality of his in-

This article is a condensation of a speech presented in Detroit, Michigan, in November 1960. Mr. Kirkpatrick is the Inspector General of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

formation that in 1940 he called on a New York lawyer, William J. Donovan, whom he asked to make two trips—one to the Mediterranean and Balkan area and one to England. The President particularly wanted to know whether the British would stand and fight, and he was also interested in all of the various elements that were active in the Mediterranean and the Balkans.

Donovan came back with basically three major items of information. First, the British would stand and fight; they would hold out until aid could come. Second, he warned that the Germans were undoubtedly going to move into North Africa. Third, he urged the President to create an organization to combine all the information and intelligence activities of the Federal government.

OSS and OWI

President Roosevelt asked him to see Attorney General Jackson, Secretary of War Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy Knox. These three gentlemen rapidly agreed with Donovan that an organization should be created to combine intelligence information and the unorthodox warfare elements of the government. Their recommendations resulted in the creation of what was first known as the Coordinator of Information Office. This organization was short-lived because it combined domestic information, news, and propaganda, as well as intelligence.

In 1942 it was split into two organizations, the Office of Strategic Services under Donovan, and the Office of War Information.

In the course of World War II, the Office of Strategic Services, working with Army and Navy Intelligence and our Allies, particularly the British and the French, mounted a fairly major

clandestine effort against the enemies.

This included dropping agents behind enemy lines, dropping guerrilla leaders into various countries—France, Norway, Italy, Burma, and Thailand—and, equally important, organizing for the first time an over-all research organization to prepare the encyclopedias of information required to conduct diplomacy or military operations in any area of the world. These provided such vital facts as beach gradients and composition, and the depth of the waters in ports and harbors. They also provided information on utilities, political structure, internal security services, and the police.

It has been generally agreed that the Office of Strategic Services made a significant contribution to the war effort and left certain heritages for peacetime. Perhaps the most important of these was the fact that General Donovan, General John Magruder, and others in the organization were looking forward to peacetime and recognized the need, in fact the necessity, for a peacetime intelligence service. As early as 1942 a paper was prepared outlining a possible structure for a peacetime service, and in 1944 Donovan again circulated in Washington a proposal for a national central intelligence organization.

This proposal was not acted upon during wartime, and when demobilization came, the Office of Strategic Services was disbanded on 18 September 1945. Fortunately, certain cadres were retained from this organization, one under the Secretary of the Army, and another, a large research organization, was transferred to the Department of State where it still exists as a major element in their research staff.

In the fall of 1945 Ferdinand Eberstadt, another New York lawyer, was

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preparing the so-called "Unification Act" which included a proposal for a Central Intelligence Agency. But President Truman wished to act more quickly, and in January 1946 he created a Central Intelligence Group to be staffed by representatives of the services, plus a permanent civilian cadre to coordinate the intelligence effort of the government.

National Security Act and CIA

Finally, in July 1947 the National Security Act was passed which created in one fell swoop the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This act embodied many of the principles which Donovan had put forth in his paper. These are quite important for a modern-day understanding of how our intelligence works.

First, he felt very strongly that there should be one voice of intelligence in the Federal government; a man to whom the President and the National Security Council could look for a statement on what was going on or what the threat was to the country.

Second, Donovan recognized that departmental responsibility should be preserved and maintained so that each of the departmental organizations could collect and process that intelligence essential to its work. For example, the Army should collect and process intelligence on the ground forces of the world.

Another important provision was that this new organization would have no domestic responsibilities; internal security should be exclusively the prerogative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the new intelligence organizations should look entirely outside the United States.

Finally, this organization would coordinate the over-all work of the intelligence agencies of the government, and the director would report to the National Security Council and the President.

US Intelligence Board

Since the passage of this act some 13 years ago, our intelligence organization has evolved, become much more closely coordinated, and we think has become more efficient. Under the Director of Central Intelligence, it operates through a United States Intelligence Board on which the directors of all of the intelligence services either sit or are represented. This board is not only the board of directors of the intelligence services, it is also the final substantive authority, passing on to the President those vital documents called "National Intelligence Estimates," perhaps the most important documents created in the intelligence mechanisms of our government.

The National Intelligence Estimates illustrate very well the degree of integration that we now have. A national estimate is a statement of what is going to happen in any country, in any area, in any given situation, and as far as possible into the future. We naturally would like to project these estimates as far in the future as possible, but the required information is not always available. Often there are current-day situations on which we do not have all of the intelligence that we would like. These estimates are put together under a Board of National Estimates, which operates in the CIA, but as a service of common concern.

Service Contributions

Each of the responsible departments prepares the original draft on that section which comes under its purview.

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Thus the Department of State would draft the section on the political, economic, or sociological development in a country or an area or a situation, while the Army would deal with ground forces, the Air Force with the air forces, the Navy with the naval forces, and the Department of Defense under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the guided missile threat.

The Board of Estimates would then go over the individual contributions very carefully—sometimes very heatedly—and arrive at a common view. Any one of the intelligence services has the right of dissent from the view which will be expressed as that of the Director of Central Intelligence. Thus if any service disagrees with the interpretation of the facts—for they are all dealing with the same facts—it can go on record before the senior policymakers of the government with their own interpretation.

A Single Voice

This system, which I have watched very closely since the war, has resulted in a high degree of unanimity among the intelligence services, yet has maintained the important right of dissent. In World War II intelligence officers often offered many possibilities to the military commanders of what the enemy might do. These might range from a massive counteroffensive, a position defense, unorthodox warfare, to surrender.

Faced with this broad spectrum of possibilities, obviously the military commander is often placed in the position of deciding himself what the enemy is going to do. This truly is a responsibility of his intelligence officer. Today, intelligence is speaking to the policymakers with one voice, or nearly so.

We should recognize that the intelligence effort of the United States is a massive effort. The flow of information into Washington is of tremendous proportions. We have information coming in from the press, the radio, travelers abroad, the official representatives of other governments as transmitted by the Foreign Service of the US, the service attachés, and the intelligence organizations.

Part of the major responsibility of our intelligence organization is to sift and filter this material, to remove the significant, to add the highly classified or sensitive material which we have obtained through a variety of means, and to present to the policymakers in concise and readable form that which they think the situation to be, and what they think is going to happen.

USSR and US Intelligence

The security aspects of intelligence in the world today are of a very high order. The Communists are extremely sensitive about intelligence efforts and ascribe to our work all types of activities, some of which are very flattering in their proportions. The Communists tell their people very little; consequently, they make it more difficult for us to find out what is happening.

Further, in the last two years we have noted a very distinct Communist campaign directed particularly at United States intelligence efforts, and at Western intelligence efforts in general. Through their very adept and facile use of fabrication, planted documents, and other devices, they have tried to discredit our work, our director, the work of various other services.

While this is flattering, it is also dangerous. During Khrushchev's visit to the United States, he made several

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comments about American intelligence efforts, indicating or implying that he read some of our messages, that he received some of our documents, and that some agents were being paid by both sides. A skillful propaganda warrior, Mr. Khrushchev, but his efforts to sow discord and distrust of US intelligence in this country failed.

The importance of our work today must not be underestimated. If we achieve our principal objective of keeping United States policymakers better informed at all times than those of any other country in the world, peace is possible. For if our diplomats are better armed with facts when they sit at the conference table, they have the tools for successful negotiation.

As I mentioned earlier, intelligence is absolutely essential to national defense. Incorrect or inaccurate intelligence, or erroneous estimates of the

future direction of those powers which are hostile to this country, could lead us to arming for the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Consequently, it is essential that we get up-to-date and vital information on what the Communist powers are doing and are planning to do.

No intelligence officer, if he is worth his salt, is ever satisfied with the amount of information or the accuracy or the validity of the information that he has at any time. He is constantly striving to get more and more information, and to assemble those vital ingredients which we call "hard facts." While today I could not say that we have all the hard facts we need, I think that we have reasonable assurance that we can anticipate any hostile activities directed at this country. Our objective is to have absolute assurance.

In a question period which followed the presentation on which the preceding article is based, Mr. Kirkpatrick made the following observations.—Editor.

QUESTION: Do the other nations of the Free World have organizations similar to the CIA with which you cooperate?

ANSWER: Yes. All governments are organized a little differently for intelligence and national security. There are no two exactly alike in the world. We cooperate closely with some of our colleagues in the NATO powers and in other powers in the Far East. This is a very important aspect of our work.

QUESTION: What are the specifications for the men who are selected for the staff of the CIA, and where are they obtained?

ANSWER: We have a recruiting program in colleges and universities, research organizations and founda-

tions, and business. We are constantly on the lookout for professionals with a wide variety of interests and of experience to come to work for us. Each year we bring in junior officers to be trained to make a lifetime career with us.

Intelligence is work in which there is no substitute for experience. It is difficult to have what might be called on-the-job training in this work. Yet our junior officers must be taken out under the wing of experienced officers. It is an exacting and a dedicated profession. The type of person we are looking for is somebody of high intelligence with a wide variety of interests, a great amount of emotional stability, and the ability to stand up under stress.